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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
All parties to this proceeding are set forth in the caption 
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PRIOR OR RELATED APPEALS 
Appellant states that there are no prior or related appeals in 
this case. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure as an appeal of right. The 
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 
78-36-11 (1953), as amended, and 78-2a-3 (1953), as amended. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT 
MR. HOM'S EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP WAS STATUTORY RATHER THAN 
CONTRACTUAL. 
The trial court dismissed Mr. Horn's breach of contract claim, 
ruling that there was no express, written contract governing the 
employment relationship between the parties. R.1126. The trial 
court ruled further that the nature of the employment relationship 
between the parties was statutory rather than contractual. R. 1126. 
The trial court also held that there was no implied contractual 
relationship between the parties. R.1126. Whether a public 
employee's relationship with is employer is contractual or statutory 
is a question of law. Further, this appears to be a question of 
first impression in Utah. Because this issue presents a question of 
law, it should be reviewed for correctness. West v. Thompson 
Newspapers, 835 P.2d 179, 182(Utah Ct. App. 1992); Fashion Place 
Inv., Ltd. v. Salt Lake County, 776 P.2d 941 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
This issue was raised and preserved at the trial court in Mr. Horn's 
Complaint, Amended Complaint and Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 1-17, 215-240, and 470-
621 respectively. Further, this issue was explicitly raised in 
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fendants' Motion to Amend Answers to Complaint, Memorandum in 
pport of Motion for Summary Judgment, and Reply Memorandum in 
pport of Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 307-315, 316-343; 344-
0, and 632-651 respectively. Finally, this issue was expressly 
eserved when it was ruled on by the trial court. R. 1126. 
II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT HELD THAT 
THE DISCOVERY RULE DID NOT APPLY TO MR. HOM'S HANDICAP 
DISCRIMINATION CLAIM. 
The trial court also dismissed Mr. Horn's perceived handicap 
scrimination claim (R.1126-1127) on the ground that Mr. Horn's claim 
s barred by the applicable four year statute of limitation because 
) there was no relation back, (2) the original complaint was not 
led within four years from the time that the § 504 claim accrued, 
d (3) the discovery rule is not appropriate under the circumstances 
this case. R. 1127. These issues present questions of law which 
is Court should review for correctness with no deference to the 
gal conclusions of the trial court. Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & 
sociates, 910 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Mr. Horn 
sponded to and raised the issues of "relation back" and discovery 
le and its application in his Memorandum in Opposition to 
fendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 470-621. Moreover, the 
ial court expressly ruled on this issue thereby preserving it. R. 
26-1127. 
III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT FOUND THAT 
MR. HOM MAY BE COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING A CLAIM 
FOR HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE IT DID NOT "RELATE 
BACK" TO THE DATE OF FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT. 
The trial court found that Mr. Horn's perceived handicap 
scrimination claim did not relate back because he was collaterally 
topped from raising this issue. R. 1127. While the order signed 
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by the trial court does not state collateral estoppel as the grounds 
for finding that the claim did not relate back, the argument 
initiated by the Defendants and responded to by Mr. Horn was based on 
the doctrine of collateral estoppel. R. 359, 488-489, 658. Whether 
or not the issue was precluded presents a question of law which this 
Court should review for correctness. Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P. 2d 1178 
(Utah 1993). This issue was raised and argued by the parties in 
their respective briefs. R. 344-440, 470-621. The issue is 
preserved as it was ruled upon by the trial court. R. 1127. 
IV. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT 
THERE WAS NO COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
INHERENT IN THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES. 
The trial court held that Mr. Horn's claim for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was dismissed because 
there was no contract governing the employment relationship between 
the parties. R. 1127. Whether or not a contract and therefore and 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists is a question 
of law. This Court should review the trial court's factual finding 
for correctness with no deference. Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door 
Corp., 883 P. 2d 285, 289 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Dubois v. Grand 
Central, 872 P.2d 1073, 1078-79 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). This issue was 
raised and preserved in Mr. Horn's Complaint, Amended Complaint and 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
R. 1-17, 215-240, and 470-621 respectively. Also, the trial court 
expressly ruled on this issue. R. 1127. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
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29 U.S.C. § 7041 Nondiscrimination under Federal grants and programs; 
promulgation of rules and regulations (See Addendum) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19-18 Dismissals and demotions - Grounds -
Disciplinary action - Procedure - Reductions in force. (See Addendum) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-23 (1953), as amended. Within six years - Mesne 
profits of real property - Instrument in writing. (See Addendum) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25 (1953), as amended. Within four years. (See 
Addendum) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-26 (1953), as amended. Within three years. (See 
Addendum) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Horn's lawsuit regards issues surrounding the termination of 
his employment with the Utah State Department of Public Safety. 
Course of Proceedings and 
piSPQsition by the District Coyrt Below 
Mr. Hom filed his original complaint in the Third Judicial 
District Court on March 21, 1994. The Defendants filed a Motion to 
Dismiss Complaint on or about July 19, 1994. Mr. Hom filed a response 
to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. On or about March 6, 1995, Mr. 
Hom filed an Amended Complaint. The Defendant Utah Department of 
Public Safety filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint on or about 
March 15, 1995. The remaining Defendants filed their Answer to the 
Amended Complaint on or about March 24, 1997. On or about March 24, 
1997 the Defendant Department of Public Safety withdrew its Motion to 
Dismiss. The trial in this case was set to begin on February 25, 
As it existed at the times relevant to Mr. Horn's termination from his employment at 
the Department. 
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1997. On or about December 6, 1996, the Defendants filed a motion 
seeking leave to amend their answers to Mr. Horn's Amended Complaint. 
The Defendants' motion seeking leave to amend was granted and the 
Defendants filed their Amended Answers on or about December 30, 1996. 
On or about December 6, 1996, the Defendants filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Mr. Horn filed his memorandum in opposition on or 
about December 31, 1996. The Defendants filed their memorandum in 
reply on or about January 13, 1997. On February 10, 1997, Mr. Horn 
filed a motion seeking leave of the Court to amend his memorandum in 
response on the basis that a Notice of Claim had been properly filed. 
The Court did not expressly rule on Mr. Horn's motion. However, at 
the oral argument on the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
Court ruled that there was no written notice of claim filed. The 
Court granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on February 
14, 1997, and the Court's order was subsequently entered on March 5, 
1997. Mr. Horn timely filed his Notice of Appeal on April 3, 1997. 
On May 6, 1997, the Defendants filed a Motion to Transfer Mr. 
Horn's appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. The Motion to Transfer was 
granted May 7, 1997. The Utah Supreme Court then poured the case 
back over to the Utah Court of Appeals on October 15, 1997. 
It also important to note the events which occurred in Mr. Horn's 
companion case filed in the United States District Court for Utah. 
Mr. Horn filed his original verified complaint in the United States 
District Court on September 26, 1991. The Defendants in that case 
filed a motion to dismiss on or about November 11, 1991. The parties 
stipulated to a dismissal of part of Mr. Horn's complaint. Mr. Horn 
submitted his Amended Verified Complaint on or about December 31, 
1992. The Defendants eventually filed an answer to Mr. Horn's amended 
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verified complaint on or about May 26, 1993. The parties then 
engaged in substantial discovery. 
On or about August 1, 1994, the Defendants filed a motion for 
summary judgment. Mr. Horn responded on September 6, 1994. At the 
Defendants request, supplemental briefing on the due process issues 
involved in the lawsuit was done by both parties. On October 11, 
1994, Mr. Horn moved the court for leave to amend his verified 
complaint. The Defendants filed a memorandum in opposition to Mr. 
Horn's motion to amend. On or about November 18, 1994, the Court 
indicated it would deny Mr. Horn's motion to amend his complaint. On 
December 1, 1994, the Court granted the Defendants1 motion for 
summary judgment. On December 8, 1994, the Court signed the order 
denying Mr. Horn's motion to amend his complaint. Mr. Horn then timely 
filed a notice of appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals on 
December 20, 1994. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rendered its 
decision in that matter on April 12, 1996. R. 411-416. 
Statement Qf Relevant F^ctS 
1. Mr. Horn's lawsuit is the result of his involuntary 
termination as a programmer/analyst from the Utah Department of 
Public Safety ("Department"). R. 363, 499, 518-19, 521. 
2. Mr. Horn was an employee of the Department from May 20, 1985 
through March 2, 1990 when he was finally terminated from his 
employment. R. 2, 518-19, 521. 
3. The reasons enunciated for Mr. Horn's termination from the 
Department are (1) Mr. Horn was perceived to be a security threat, (2) 
Mr. Horn had committed perjury, and (3) Mr. Horn had been 
insubordinate. R. 492-93, 494-98. 
4. Douglas Bodrero ("Bodrero") made the ultimate decision to 
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terminate Mr. Hom from his employment with the Department. However, 
Bodrero did not personally observe any misbehavior by Mr. Hom. R. 
585-586. 
5. On or about November 13, 1989, Brant Johnson, the Deputy 
Commissioner of Public Safety, sent a letter to Mr. Hom notifying him 
that Mr. Johnson intended to terminate his employment. This letter 
outlined the alleged reasons for Mr. Horn's termination as 
insubordination, malfeasance/non-feasance, perjury, and that Mr. Hom 
was a security risk. R. 492-93. 
6. Mr. Johnson's decision to terminate Mr. Hom was based on 
the recommendation of A. Roland Squire ("Squire"), who was at that 
time the Director of Management Information Services. R. 430, 434-
438,494-98, 932-36. 
7. When Mr. Hom began his employment with the Department, 
Arthur Hudachko ("Hudachko") was his immediate supervisor. R. 526-
27, 964-65. 
8. Prior to being hired by the Department, a complete and 
thorough background search and check was done on Mr. Hom. R. 520. 
9. While employed with the Department, Mr. Hom received 
promotions. R. 2-3. Mr. Hom also received commendations for his 
efforts, dedication and perseverance as an invaluable employee of the 
Department. R. 542, 543, 544; 521-22, 523,524,524. Mr. Hom also 
received near perfect evaluations from Hudachko. However, Hudachko 
had also did at times counsel Mr. Hom to try and improve his 
political and people skills. R. 527. 
10. One of Mr. Horn's job responsibilities was to be on call in 
the event that a programmer was needed to help solve any technical 
problem that may arise regarding the computer system for both the 
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Bureau of Criminal Investigation ("BCI") and the Driver's License 
Division of the Department. Mr. Horn was on uninterrupted call for 
these reasons for a period of four and one-half (4 ^ ) years. R. 545. 
11. In addition to being on call most of the time, Mr. Horn also 
served on a "Request for Proposal Committee" ("RFP committee") formed 
by the Department to select a vendor to provide computer software 
and/or hardware for the Driver's License Division. Mr. Horn was 
appointed as the technical subcommittee chairperson by Hudachko. 
R.499-502, 538. 
12. Prior to being selected to perform on the RFP committee, 
Hudachko, Mr. Horn's supervisor at the time, had never given Mr. Horn 
any written discipline. R. 526-27. 
13. At the time the RFP committee began to consider vendor bids 
for a new computer system, Bodrero was the Deputy Commissioner for 
the Department, and the RFP process was conducted pursuant to his 
guidance and supervision. R. 500. 
14. Bart Blackstock ("Blackstock") of the Driver License 
Division of the Department was appointed to act as the chairperson of 
the RFP committee. Ertel, an employee of the Driver License 
Division, was appointed as the administrative subcommittee 
chairperson of the RFP committee. R. 500. 
15. Mr. Horn and all other RFP committee members were aware of 
Utah law governing the bidding processes and procedures that must be 
utilized when seeking proposals such as those sought by the RFP 
committee in this instance. R. 500. 
16. Mr. Horn's significant and regular work duties did not 
decrease after he was appointed to the RFP committee. As a result, 
Mr. Horn was faced with a huge increase in work. R. 528. Because Mr. 
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Hom had assumed additional work, he would sometimes work 20 hours or 
more a day trying to stay on top of his regular duties as well as his 
duties associated with the RFP committee. R. 507. This led to a 
"gentlemen's agreement11 between Mr. Hom and Hudachko (Mr. Horn's 
supervisor at the time) whereby Mr. Hom would keep track of his 
overtime and Hudachko would make sure that Mr. Hom got his 
corresponding leave. R. 499-517; R. 529-530. This agreement, for 
informal resolution of compensatory time, led Mr. Hom to believe that 
he had an ally in Hudachko. R. 507-508. 
17. Despite the demands of Mr. Horn's regular work duties, Mr. 
Hom continued to work diligently on the RFP committee. However, it 
was becoming obvious to Mr. Hom that the RFP process was a political 
quagmire. R. 506. 
18. In an effort to recoup his significant unpaid compensatory 
time, Mr. Hom filed a grievance which resulted in him being awarded 
some 600 hours of compensatory time. By filing this grievance, Mr. 
Hom alienated Hudachko and others. The filing of a grievance was not 
the way that such things were done at the Department. R. 508, 529-
531 . 
19. While serving on the RFP committee, Mr. Hom became aware of 
activities by certain committee members which were contrary to the 
mandates of Utah law, specifically the Utah Procurement Code (UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 63-56-1 et al.). R. 499-517. Mr. Hom was familiar with the 
Utah Procurement Code. Other problems of which Mr. Hom was aware 
were orders given by Bodrero leading to a manipulation of the vendor 
selection process. Also, Blackstock had a personal relationship with 
one of the bidders. R. 499-517. Mr. Hom told Blackstock and 
Hudachko of his concerns over the legality of the process. In 
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addition, the Mr. Horn engaged in further investigation regarding the 
proposal of one bidder (C.A.C.I.) which he felt was deficient in 
reporting its technical qualifications. R. 499-517. 
20. The RFP process consisted of three phases. The first phase 
consisted of solicitation of bids for a partial solution. Following 
this, the RFP committee modified the "request for proposal" and 
solicited bids for a total solution. During this second phase, 
approximately 10 vendors remained on the vendor pool. R. 500-01; 
529. 
21. After the second phase, Ertel and others acted in an 
arbitrary manner in creating a false standard by which to eliminate 
some of the vendors. Mr. Horn strenuously objected to the standard of 
elimination chosen. Mr. Horn believed that the RFP committee could 
not lawfully, under the Utah Procurement Code, eliminate vendors 
merely because they had not disclosed their profit margins, 
especially when such a requirement was not requested in the original 
request for proposals. R. 501. 
22. Despite Mr. Horn's strong objections and concerns regarding 
this method of vendor elimination, all of which were voiced in the 
RFP committee meetings, the RFP committee returned early from lunch 
and voted to use the false standard as a method for eliminating some 
of the vendors. Mr. Horn was not told to return early from lunch for 
such a vote. In fact, the vote purposely was taken in Mr. Horn's 
absence. R. 501-02. The vote cut the pool of vendor candidates from 
ten to six. Of the remaining six vendors, C.A.C.I. was still a 
candidate as were IBM and Digital, both of whom proposed on-site 
systems. R. 502. 
23. The vendor, C.A.C.I, had submitted a bid with its profit 
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margins disclosed. Also, C.A.C.I had submitted a very detailed bid 
despite not having been in attendance at a meeting of the bidders 
where the details were discussed. R. 502, 505. 
24. Mr. Horn, as he was required to do as the technical 
subcommittee chairperson, further investigated the proposal of 
C.A.C.I. C.A.C.I. had failed to disclose a list of its technical 
users. Through this investigation, it was discovered that the state 
of Wyoming was a technical user of the C.A.C.I. system. Mr. Horn told 
Blackstock of the problems which Wyoming had with the C.A.C.I. 
system. Blackstock became angry at Mr. Horn for doing the 
investigation of C.A.C.Ifs bid. Ertel was also angry about Mr. Horn's 
in-depth investigation. R. 502. 
25. Mr. Horn told Blackstock and Hudachko that he was concerned 
with the legality of the RFP process. R. 505-06; 539-541. Despite 
the concerns about the legality and possible liability surrounding 
the RFP process expressed by Mr. Horn, Bodrero claims that he was not 
aware, until after Mr. Horn had filed his lawsuit, that Mr. Horn had 
made allegations of illegality in the RFP process. R. 593. 
26. As a result of mounting tensions in the RFP Committee, Mr. 
Horn tendered a resignation to Blackstock, the Director of the 
Driver's License Division and the RFP Committee Chairperson. 
Blackstock refused Mr. Horn's resignation. R. 499-517. 
27. Prior to serving on the RFP committee, Mr. Horn had a good 
working relationship with his co-workers. R. 552-506. However, due 
to his deteriorating relationship with the RFP committee members, 
Hudachko received several complaints about Mr. Horn from some of the 
RFP committee members. R. 527, 532-533, 534. Bodrero had also heard 
complaints about Mr. Horn from some members of the RFP committee. R. 
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582- 28. Mr. Horn maintains that these complaints tainted Bodrero's 
opinion about Mr. Horn. R. 504. 
29. About this time, an internal affairs investigation was done 
on Mr. Horn. The internal affairs investigation was the result of 
complaints about Mr. Horn by Ertel. R. 508; 548-554. 
30. While serving on the RFP committee, Mr. Horn learned that 
Bodrero, who was at the time a Deputy Commissioner of the Department 
of Public Safety, wanted a specific computer system. Bodrero wanted 
an on-site system. Bodrero lobbied the RFP committee during the 
procurement process for an on-site system. R. 500, 503, 591 . Again, 
Mr. Horn perceived these lobbying efforts as illegal. R. 500, 503. 
31. After this point, the vendor pool had decreased from ten 
vendors to six vendors. Bodrero asked Mr. Horn to do a one-on-one 
comparison and technical evaluation of two of the six vendors, IBM 
and Digital. R. 602. Mr. Horn again objected on the grounds of 
illegality under the Utah Procurement Code. R. 503. Despite his 
objections, Mr. Horn dutifully carried out Bodrero's request. R. 503. 
In fact, other vendors were also displeased and concerned with 
Bodrero's order for a one-on-one comparison and they voiced their 
concerns by filing grievances. R. 504. 
32. Bodrero was displeased with Mr. Horn's objections to 
comparing only two of the vendors. Mr. Horn maintains that Bodrero 
was also displeased because of Mr. Horn's objections to Bodrero's 
lobbying efforts and the complaints received by Bodrero from some of 
the RFP committee members. R. 504. 
33. Two vendors were ultimately selected for final 
consideration, IBM and Digital. A final report needed to be 
prepared. As part of his duties, Mr. Horn prepared the technical 
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section of the final report. In the final report, Mr. Hom noted that 
IBM did not have an approved security protocol and therefor was 
unacceptable. When Mr. Hom completed his section of the final 
report, he gave the report to Ertel and Jill Laws. Ertel and Laws 
made substantive changes to the report so that it stated that IBM did 
in fact have the appropriate security protocol. Mr. Hom again voiced 
his objections. R. 504, 505, 549-550. 34. When it came time for 
the final report to be presented to the decision making body, Mr. Hom 
was prevented from participating in making the presentation. Bodrero 
would not allow Mr. Hom to make the presentation. R. 505. 
35. Bodrero claims that he was unaware of Mr. Horn's concerns 
regarding the legality of the RFP process and that he was also 
unaware that Mr. Hom had tried to resign from the RFP committee. R. 
593. 
36. Prior to the RFP process coming to a close, Mr. Hom went to 
Hudachko to take advantage of their "gentlemen's agreement" regarding 
the compensatory leave time. Because of the stress and pressure that 
had been put onto Mr. Hom as a result of being overworked, Mr. Hom 
felt like he was alone and had to finally stand up and do something 
for himself. R. 507, 508. The relationship between Mr. Hom and 
Hudachko began to deteriorate. R. 531-536. At this point, Mr. Hom 
filed a grievance to collect all of his overtime hours. R. 507, 508, 
531-536. 
37. Hudachko was not pleased that Mr. Hom had filed a grievance 
to collect his unpaid overtime. This grievance contributed to the 
decrease in communication between Mr. Hom and Hudachko. R.531-536. 
Hudachko threatened Mr. Horn's employment because of this grievance. 
R.508. 
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38. Also while the RFP process was ongoing, upon information 
and belief, Blackstock approached Fred Schwendiman ("Schwendiman"), 
the Director for the Driver's License Division of the Department, and 
complained about Mr. Horn's involvement and participation in the RFP 
process. R.503. 
39. About this same time, Schwendiman banned Mr. Hom from the 
third floor of the building in which Mr. Hom worked. R.503. The fact 
that Mr. Hom had been banned from access to the third floor was an 
important issue considered by Bodrero when Bodrero decided to 
terminate Mr. Horn's employment. R.581-582. It is Mr. Horn's 
contention that he was banned from the third floor in retaliation for 
speaking out about the illegality of the actions of the RFP 
committee. R.503. 
40. From November of 1988 through May of 1989, Mr. Hom was away 
from work using the compensatory time awarded to him as a result of 
his grievance. R.509. During this period, Mr. Hom would on occasion 
come into work for the purpose of attending staff meetings and 
receiving training. R.509. 
41. Mr. Hom returned to work in May 1989 to begin training. R. 
509. During Mr. Horn's absence, Mr. Hom did not do any work on the 
computer system for the Driver's License Division. R. 509; 555-556. 
Instead, another computer programmer/analyst, Kuang-Po-Lee, assumed 
the responsibilities with regard to the Driver's License computer 
system. R.510, 556-557. 
42. While Mr. Hom was using his compensatory time, Squire 
became the Management Information Services Director. This occurred 
in March of 1989. Thus, Squire became Mr. Horn's new supervisor. R. 
509, 430-431. 
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43. During Mr. Horn's absence from work, in response to 
legislative enactments, it was necessary for Lee to make certain 
changes to the Driver's License computer system. R.556-557. Mr. Hom 
did not have occasion to know these changes and modifications nor was 
Mr. Hom informed of any changes or modifications prior to supervising 
the "annual job run" in July, 1989. R. 527, 510. 
44. The Driver's License Division of the Department conducted, 
during the summer months, a purging process of certain computer 
files. This is referred to as the "annual job run." R. 509. 
45. Mr. Hom was informed that he would be the individual "on-
call" to supervise the 1989 annual job run on a Thursday afternoon 
while Mr. Hom was in a training session. R. 510. The 1989 annual 
job run was to take place that following weekend beginning on 
Saturday morning. Mr. Hom did not have time to become acquainted 
with the changes and modifications which had been made to the system 
prior to the beginning of the annual job run. R. 510. 
46. The individuals who were responsible for the annual job 
run, Blackstock and Squire, were aware that Mr. Hom had not had any 
hands-on experience with the Driver's License system for the previous 
ten months. Despite this knowledge, they assigned Mr. Hom to be in 
charge of the annual job run. R. 558. 
47. The annual job run had been done once a year since 1977. 
Ertel, a driver's license employee and user of the system, had been 
present at all previous job runs. R. 509-510, 559. However, Ertel 
scheduled vacation during the 1989 annual job run. R. 559. Thus, 
Ertel would not be available if anything were to go wrong during the 
annual job run. Blackstock and Squire were aware that Ertel was not 
going to be available for the annual job run. R. 559. However, Mr. 
-15-
Horn was not informed that Ertel was going to be unavailable. R. 510-
511 . 
48. Bodrero claims that at the time of the annual job run he 
was not aware that Ertel had been allowed to take vacation the 
weekend of the annual job run. R. 597. 
49. The annual job run, with one exception, had on all previous 
occasions had problems. R. 555-556. Thus, it was imperative that 
Ertel be available during the annual job run. R. 510, 511. 
50. Blackstock and Ertel were the only two people at the time 
who could schedule the annual job run. Mr. Horn contends that Ertel's 
vacation was scheduled during the annual job run in retaliation for 
Mr. Horn having voiced his concerns during the RFP process and in 
retaliation for Mr. Horn having filed a grievance for his unpaid 
compensatory time. R. 499-517. 
51. As expected, the 1989 annual job run did have problems. 
The problems required the attention and presence of Ertel. Mr. Horn 
attempted to contact Ertel and it was at that time that he learned 
that Ertel was out of town and unavailable to be of assistance to 
him. R. 510-513. 
52. Mr. Horn contacted Squire after his failed attempts to 
contact Ertel and his continuous and exhausting efforts to correct 
the problems himself. Mr. Horn explained the situation to Squire. R. 
511-512. Mr. Horn offered several alternative courses of action to 
Squire. Mr. Horn and Squire decided that the BCI would call Ertelfs 
residence every hour and that the system would be put in browse mode 
so that police officer users could access necessary information. R. 
511-512. 
53. During this conversation, Squire asked Mr. Horn if he had 
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contacted Blackstock. Mr. Hom told Squire that he had not because 
there was nothing that Blackstock could do to help Mr. Hom. Any 
decisions that had to be made would necessarily involve budgetary 
considerations. Such a decision could not be made by Mr. Hom. R. 
511-512. Moreover, Squire had on a previous occasion told Mr. Hom 
that decisions with budgetary implications needed to be made by 
Squire. R. 512. In addition, Squire had previously admonished Mr. 
Hom that any business contacts with the Driver's License Division 
were to be made by Squire. R. 499-517. 
54. Ertel was finally located by the BCI. Ertel returned Mr. 
Horn's call. During this conversation, Mr. Hom stressed that Ertel 
needed to come in to work that evening (Sunday). R. 512. Ertel told 
Mr. Hom that the problem did not sound serious and that she would 
meet him early the next morning so that they could get the system 
operating at full capacity by 8:00 a.m. R. 512. 
55. The following day, Mr. Hom arrived at work some time before 
6:00 a.m. Mr. Hom recalls the time because he looked at the clock. 
Apparently the entry and security systems did not properly record his 
entry into the premises. R. 512-513. 
56. Mr. Hom had entered the building through a computer door on 
the west side of the building. He inserted his access card and 
punched in his number as usual. R. 513. Mr. Hom then went 
downstairs to his secured office area. The door to Mr. Horn's office 
was already opened when he arrived. The log indicated that the door 
had been opened prior to 6:00 a.m. by the security guard. R. 513. 
Upon information and belief, Mr. Hom contends that the Honeywell 
access on the west side of the building had been disarmed prior to 
his entry into the building and therefore did not record his number 
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when he entered the building. R. 513. Shortly after Mr. Horn 
arrived, he logged onto the computer. Mr. Horn did not, at that time, 
log onto the IBM main frame computer so as to avoid a billing for his 
usage time. Mr. Horn eventually logged onto the IBM main frame 
computer at 7:05 a.m. R. 513. 
57. Ertel did not arrive at work until after 8:00 a.m. She did 
not phone to tell Mr. Horn that she was going to be late until after 
8:00 a.m. She left a message with the secretary. R. 513. Mr. Horn 
did not receive this message. R. 513. When Ertel finally did 
arrive, she and Mr. Horn were able to get the problems corrected and 
had the computer up and running at full capacity by 10:00 a.m. R. 
513. 77 and 127. 
58. On or about August 4, 1989, Squire issued a letter of 
intent to reprimand Mr. Horn contending that Mr. Horn had been 
insubordinate for failing to contact Blackstock as Squire had 
requested of Mr. Horn. R. 562-567. On or about August 17, 1989, 
Squire issued a letter of reprimand to Mr. Horn. R. 569-574. Mr. Horn 
submitted a response to Squire's letter of intent to reprimand. R. 
569-574. Mr. Horn grieved Squire's letter of reprimand. R. 513. 
59. Prior to the grievance hearing, Squire called Mr. Horn into 
his office and attempted to get Mr. Horn to swear to an oath of blind 
and irrational loyalty. Also, Squire sought an admission of total 
fault for the annual job run failure. Mr. Horn refused both of 
Squire's requests. R. 513-514. During this meeting, Mr. Horn 
explained to Squire that if he disagreed or had any problems with 
Squire's directives that Mr. Horn would explain the problem or 
disagreement and if Squire still insisted that Mr. Horn do something 
that Mr. Horn would obey. Mr. Horn explained to Squire that he would 
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not do anything that would be catastrophic to the system. This was 
not satisfactory to Squire. Squire tape recorded this conversation. 
R. 513-514. 
60. The Appellees contend that during the grievance hearing, 
Mr. Horn committed perjury. R. 499-517. The Appellees1 accusation of 
perjury is the result of their choosing to believe Ertel rather than 
Mr. Horn. However, Ertel testified during her deposition in this case 
differently than she testified at the grievance hearing. Despite 
Ertelfs lack of candor, she has not been the subject of discipline 
for perjury. R. 499-517. 
61 . Bodrero was aware that Mr. Horn had been blamed for the 
failure of the annual job run and he considered this in determining 
whether to terminate Mr. Horn's employment with the Department. R. 
597. 
62. Mr. Horn still had unused compensatory time. Mr. Horn 
submitted a request for leave which was approved by Squire. When Mr. 
Horn was using this approved compensatory time, Squire telephoned him 
at home and wanted to know why Mr. Horn was not at work. Mr. Horn 
explained to Squire that Squire had approved his leave. Squire 
denied doing so. Mr. Horn came into work and was given no assignments 
that day. R. 514, 575-576. 
63. Soon thereafter, Squire placed Mr. Horn on a two-week 
compensatory leave. As a result Mr. Horn was away from work from 
September 11 through September 29, 1989. When Mr. Horn returned to 
work, he discovered that his security code clearances had been 
revoked. No one told Mr. Horn in advance that his security clearance 
was going to be revoked. R. 514, 515. The revocation of his 
security clearance prevented Mr. Horn from doing his job. R. 514. Mr. 
-19-
Horn was told that his security clearance was revoked as a result of 
an FBI recommendation and because he was considered to be a security 
risk. R. 515. 
64. In October 1989, Mr. Horn was attempting to gather 
information for the processing of his grievance. He went to the BCI 
Department to assist him in that endeavor. R. 514-515. 
65. The following day, Mr. Horn was summoned to a meeting with 
Richard Townsend ("Townsend"), the BCI chief. It is Mr. Horn's 
recollection that during this meeting, Townsend attempted to dissuade 
Mr. Horn from prosecuting his grievance. R. 515. 
66. Townsend claims that he did not try to dissuade Mr. Horn 
from pursuing his grievance. In fact, Townsend claims that he 
reassured Mr. Horn that he would provide whatever assistance he needed 
for his grievance but that Mr. Horn would have to secure such material 
through Townsend. At this point, Mr. Horn broke down and began to cry 
uncontrollably. R. 603. 
67. In Townsend's opinion, Mr. Horn was on a "downward spiral" 
and he had become "paranoid" and "kooky," and "was a distraught 
emotional mess." R. 605. Ertel and others also perceived a change 
in Mr. Horn's demeanor. R. 552-554. Ertel claims to have brought 
Horn's mental condition to the attention of Horn's superiors. R. 554. 
68. Townsend warned Mr. Horn to work things out with Squire. R. 
606. 
69. Mr. Horn recalls being asked by Townsend if he had knowledge 
which could in effect bring the state to its knees. Mr. Horn 
remembers this question in the context of discussion regarding 
another employee. Mr. Horn contends that Townsend posed the question 
regarding the integrity of the system. R. 515. 
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70. Townsend recalls the discussion regarding "bringing the 
state to its knees" differently. According to Townsend, Mr. Hom made 
a comment about having knowledge to bring the state to its knees 
completely out of the blue. R. 614. 
71. After the meeting between Mr. Hom and Townsend, Townsend 
did not take the comments allegedly made by Mr. Hom seriously because 
Mr. Hom had been so distressed during the conversation. R. 607-608. 
72. Despite Townsend's beliefs and observations regarding Mr. 
Horn's mental state, he did not make a referral for counseling or help 
for Mr. Hom. R. 618. 
73. Bodrero also noticed a change in Mr. Horn's behavior. R. 
586-588. Bodrero, likewise, did not recommend that Mr. Hom utilize 
the employee assistance program. Bodrero believed that Mr. Hom had 
been offered help but that Mr. Hom had refused the help. R. 588. 
75. Bodrero claims that he did not give an order restricting 
any of Mr. Horn's accesses to the state computer system. R. 589. 
Bodrero does not know if Townsend attempted to corroborate or confirm 
anything regarding the security risk issue prior to Mr. Hom being 
restricted. R. 590. 
76. Following his termination, Mr. Hom exercised his rights 
under the Utah State Personnel Management Act and pursued a 
grievance. Although Mr. Horn's grievance was ultimately dismissed for 
failure to prosecute, this dismissal occurred while Mr. Horn's 
§ 1983 lawsuit was pending before the United States District Court. 
R. 499-517. 
77. Prior to filing his federal lawsuit, Mr. Hom duly filed his 
Notice of Claim on September 26, 1990. R. 1087-1111. The State of 
Utah acknowledged receipt of Mr. Horn's Notice of Claim and denied Mr. 
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Horn's claim on November 5, 1990. R. 1086. 
78. Mr. Horn was diligent in the prosecution of his case before 
the United States District Court. During the course of discovery, 
Mr. Horn became aware of facts surrounding his termination which would 
support a claim for handicap discrimination under the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. It was not until the 
depositions of Roland Squire, Arthur Hudachko, Richard Townsend, 
Cherie Ertel and Douglas Bodrero were taken that Mr. Horn became aware 
of facts supporting a claim for handicap discrimination. Prior to 
these depositions, Mr. Horn was totally unaware that he was perceived 
by the Appellees and others as having mental and emotional problems. 
There had been absolutely no inkling that this perception was a 
motivating factor in his dismissal. R. 363, 494-498. These 
depositions took place on July 12, 1994 (Bodrero); July 14, 1994 
(Ertel and Townsend); and August 5, 1994 (Hudachko). R. 414. 
79. After Mr. Horn's counsel had learned of the facts supportive 
of a claim for handicap discrimination and after thoughtfully 
considering their implications, Mr. Horn chose to file a motion to 
amend his complaint with the United States District Court to include 
a claim for perceived handicap discrimination under the 
Rehabilitation Act. The American's with Disabilities Act had not yet 
been enacted. R. 499-517. 
80. The United States District Court ultimately denied Mr. 
Horn's motion seeking leave to amend his complaint to add a claim for 
perceived handicap discrimination. R. 417-419. The motion seeking 
leave to amend was denied on the grounds that it was too close to the 
trial date to allow such an amendment as it would be prejudicial to 
the Defendants in that case. The United State District Court did not 
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decide the merits of the perceived handicap discrimination claim. 
Nor did the United States District Court rule that the discovery rule 
did not apply under the facts of the case pending before it. R.418-
419. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred when it ruled that the nature of the 
employment relationship between Mr. Horn and the Department was 
statutory rather than contractual. While Mr. Horn's status as a 
public employee was defined by statute, the character of his 
employment relationship was based upon written instruments, including 
the State Personnel Management Act and its rules and regulations. 
Thus, Mr. Horn's claim for breach of his employment contract was 
founded upon a written instrument making the six year statute of 
limitations applicable. Moreover, Utah courts have traditionally 
treated the relationship between a public employee and his employer 
as contractual. 
The trial court also erred when it dismissed Mr. Horn's claim for 
perceived handicap discrimination. The discovery rule should be 
applied to toll the statute of limitations. Mr. Horn was diligent in 
pursuing his federal lawsuit. It was the Appellees, not Mr. Horn, who 
were the cause of the delay in discovering the factual basis for the 
handicap discrimination claim. In addition, until Mr. Horn was 
finally able to secure the deposition testimony of certain witnesses, 
he had absolutely no idea that one of the motivating factors for 
termination was the perception by his employer and others that he was 
handicapped. Because the Appellees actively concealed the facts 
supporting the handicap discrimination claim from Mr. Horn, they 
should be estopped from defending against the claim on the basis of 
-23-
the running of the limitations period. Moreover, because of the 
exceptional circumstances of this case, it would be unjust not to 
toll the statute of limitations. Mr. Horn's claim for handicap 
discrimination is meritorious. 
Finally, the trial court erred when it dismissed Mr. Horn's claim 
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Because Mr. Horn's breach of contract claim is founded on a written 
instrument, his breach of the implied covenant claim is valid and is 
covered by the same limitations period as the breach of contract 
claim. 
ARGUMENT 
The granting of the Appellees' motion for summary judgment led 
to the dismissal of Mr. Horn's complaint against the Appellees in the 
trial court, ""in reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we review 
the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party.'" Glover v. Boy Scouts of 
America, 923 P. 2d 1383, 1384 (Utah 1996) (quoting Harline v. Barker, 
912 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted)). The court should 
"construe the evidentiary material submitted on the motion and all 
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable 
to the party opposing the motion." Thurston v. Box Elder County, 835 
P.2d 165, 166 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted). Moreover, "[s]ummary 
judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact 
exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law." K&T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P. 2d 623, 626-27 (Utah 1994) 
(citations omitted)); UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c). Finally, "[b]ecause 
summary judgment presents only questions of law, [the court] 
review[s] the trial court's determinations under a standard of 
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correctness, according no deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions." Maoris & Associates, Inc. v. Images & Attitude, Inc., 
941 P. 2d 636, 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citation omitted); Sanderson 
v. First Security Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 303, 306 (Utah 1992) 
(citations omitted). Here, the Court of Appeals should reverse the 
trial court's decision to grant summary judgment against Mr. Horn. 
I. BECAUSE MR. HOM'S EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE STATE OF 
UTAH IS CONTRACTUAL RATHER THAN STATUTORY, THE TRIAL COURT 
COMMITTED ERROR BY DISMISSING HIS BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM. 
A. The Nature Of The Employment Relationship Between The 
Parties Is Contractual. Not Statutory. 
The trial court erred by dismissing Mr. Horn's breach of contract 
claim on the basis that Mr. Horn's employment relationship with the 
Department was statutory and not contractual. This is a premise 
which is not supported by fact or law. Whether a public employees 
relationship with his employer is statutory rather than contractual 
is an issue of first impression in Utah. Mr. Horn was a public 
employee pursuant to contractual terms and conditions which were 
often fleshed out by legislative enactment. Mr. Horn's employment 
relationship with the Department was governed by a written contract. 
Thus, the six year statute of limitations is applicable, rather than 
the three year statute of limitations relied upon by the trial court2. 
Mr. Horn was employed pursuant to a written contract whose terms 
and conditions were provided by statute3. Mr. Horn was employed 
pursuant to a contract whose express terms and conditions are 
See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-12-26 (three years for actions arising out of liability-
created by the statutes of this state) and 78-12-23 (six years for actions founded upon 
an instrument in writing). 
3 
There is no question that Mr. Horn was a "public employee*1 and not a "public 
official." 
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supplied by statutory and regulative sources. Mr. Horn's status as an 
employee is created by statute. But, the relationship between Mr. 
Horn and his employer is contractual with the precise terms and 
conditions of that contractual relationship being found in various 
sources including the Department of Human Resources Management 
("DHRM") Rules and Regulations4. 
Prior to the enactment of the State Personnel Management Act 
(the "Management Act"), the relationship between the State, as an 
employer, and its employees was contractual. This relationship was 
similar to the nature of the employment relationship between a 
private employer and its employees. The enactment of the Management 
Act did not change the character of that relationship. The 
Management Act simply added a layer of protection to those 
individuals employed by the State5. The Management Act created 
uniformity, but it did not change the underlying basic contractual 
relationship between the State and its employees. The contractual 
relationship between Mr. Horn and the Department in this case is 
premised upon well established common law foundation of contractual 
relations between and employer and his employees, long recognized by 
Utah courts. 
For example, in Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 
P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court found that the terms 
and conditions of Piacitelli's employment were governed by the 
See State Personnel Management Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 67-16-1 et seq. and UTAH 
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, R477. 
5
 See e.g. Thurston v. Box Elder County, 835 P.2d 165, 169 (Utah 1992) (if the 
employer's actions were allowed to nullify the requirements of the statutory state law, 
such action would "leav[e] employees subject to arbitrary treatment by their 
superiors.") 
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College's Personnel Manual6. Thus, the Court reasoned that they were 
"construing a contract, not declaring statutory or constitutional 
rights." Id. 
Like the employer college in Piacitelli, here, the employer 
Department chose to promulgate rules and regulations governing its 
employment relationship with its employees, including Mr. Horn. In 
essence, the statutes and regulations adopted by the State of Utah 
constitute its employment manual. Because the State of Utah has 
chosen to establish and mandate these rules and regulations, it has 
undertaken certain contractual obligations, not the least of which is 
it cannot fire its employees without just cause. It should not make 
a difference that the State of Utah, as an employer, must so act 
through legislative enactment. UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19-18. In 
addition, the rules and regulations promulgated by the State of Utah 
make numerous references to contracts and agreements between the 
employer and the employee. See R. at 620. Thus, the existence of 
the statutes and regulations governing the terms and conditions of 
Mr. Horn's employment are not mutually exclusive from that employment. 
Rather, they create the express terms and conditions of Mr. Horn's 
employment. These express terms and conditions were agreed to by Mr. 
Horn when he accepted his employment with the Department. Mr. Horn's 
employment relationship with the Department was contractual despite 
the fact that the terms which he seeks to enforce are subject to 
The Court went on to note:"[t]his finding comports with the numerous holdings 
that an educational institution may undertake a contractual obligation to observe 
particular termination formalities by adopting procedures or by promulgating rules and 
regulations governing the employment relationship." Id. at 1066 (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
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legislative change.7 This is classic example of a unilateral 
contract. See Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 540 N.W. 2d 277 
(Iowa 1995); Thorn v. Bloomfield Hills Board of Education, 513 N.W.2d 
230 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Manning v. City of Hazel Park, 509 N.W.2d 
874 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Geraghty v. Township of Berkeley Heights, 
613 A.2d 497 (N.J. Super. 1990); Merrell v. Bay County Metropolitan 
Trans. Auth., 707 F. Supp. 289 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Department of 
Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Boyd, 525 So.2d 432 (Fla. Ct. 
App. 1988); Ness v. Glasscock, 781 P.2d 137 (Co. Ct. App. 1989); and 
Bennett v. Marshall Public Library, 746 F. Supp. 671 (W.D. Mich. 
1990). 
Another example of the public employee/employer relationship 
being treated as contractual can be found in Thurston v. Box Elder 
County, 892 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1995) (Thurston II). In Thurston, the 
employee, a former county (i.e. public) employee, sought relief for 
a breach of employment contract with regard to a reduction in force. 
The trial court granted summary judgment against Mr. Thurston.8 On 
appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that the County had not properly 
considered the statutory guidelines when creating its Manual as 
mandated by state law. Because the County had failed to comply with 
the statutory guidelines in formulating the contractual relationship 
As is the case with any employer's employment manual. "The existence of such a 
contractual obligation does not preclude an employer's changing current procedures and 
regulations according to existing practices and procedures for amendment. Thus, it has 
been held that an employer's policy manual may give rise t o employee contractual rights 
even where it "can be unilaterally amended by the employerwithout notice to the 
employee." Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 615, 292 M.W.2d 
880,892 (1980) (non-educational employer). See also, Knowles v. Unity College, Me. 429 
A.2d 220 (1981). Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d at n.5. 
g 
The County argued that it had properly applied the provisions of its Manual in 
selecting Mr. Thurston as a candidate for termination pursuant to the reduction in 
force. 
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between it and its employees, the case was remanded for further 
consideration. Id. at 170. 
On remand, the trial court "ruled that the Act governed the 
dispute and that the County had improperly considered factors beyond 
those enumerated in the Act in terminating Thurston. On that basis, 
the court held that the County had violated Thurston's due process 
rights and breached its employment contract with Thurston." Thurston 
II, 892 P. 2d at 1035-36. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed that 
conclusion. Id. at 1039. Finally, in Thurston II, the Utah Supreme 
Court pointedly found that 
Thurston's action is not based upon any statutory violation for 
which reinstatement is a prescribed remedy. Accordingly, the 
cases based upon statutory violations which Thurston cites are 
not persuasive on the appropriate remedy for his breach of 
contract action.9 As stated above, an order for reinstatement 
is permissible in a breach of employment contract action as an 
equitable remedy when damages are inadequate or unascertainable. 
Id. at 1042. Thus, the highest court of this state has recognized 
and accepted the fundamental principle that the nature of the 
relationship between a public employee and his employer is 
contractual; not statutory. 
As in Thurston, here, Mr. Horn is seeking relief for the breach 
of the employment contract with the Department. Also, like Box Elder 
County, here, the State of Utah was required to and did promulgate 
rules and regulations governing the employment relationship with its 
employees. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19-6 (1953), as amended; UTAH 
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE R477. In addition, like the employment relationship 
"As we noted in Thurston I, this case was brought as an action for breach of an 
employment contract, not as a request for judicial review of Thurston's grievance 
appeal. The termination of remedies in a review of administrative appeals is not based 
upon the same legal principles as those used to determine remedies in breach of contract 
actions." Thurston II, 892 P.2d at n. 3. 
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in Thurston, here the terms and conditions of Mr. Horn's employment 
were created by the Department of Human Resource Management rules and 
regulations, i.e. the manual, and by statute. The governing state 
statute in each case defines and establishes the basic terms and 
conditions of employment for merit covered employees. However, this 
does not make the relationship statutory in nature. 
Finally, the nature of the employment relationship can also be 
gleaned from an examination of cases dealing with public employee 
pension plans. In Newcomb v. Ogden City Public School Teachers* 
Retirement Commission, 243 P. 2d 941 (Utah 1952), the Utah Supreme 
Court recognized that a public employee's employment is a creature of 
contract whose terms are supplied by, and from time-to-time, modified 
by legislative enactments. As part of its analysis of the nature of 
a public employee's claim to enforcement of previously created 
retirement promises, the court stated: 
The statute or ordinance becomes a part of the employee's 
contract of employment as though actually incorporated 
therein and the right to a pension becomes as much a part 
of the agreed compensation for the services of the employee 
as the monthly stipend, but it is deferred in payment until 
after his retirement 
With the acceptance by the plaintiffs of the 
defendant's offer, a contract was made which precluded the 
defendant from afterwards reducing in amount the pension to 
which the plaintiff became entitled for life, . . . even 
though the grantor of the pension was the state and not a 
private corporation .... 
Id. at 944. 
There is no basis to distinguish the Newcomb decision from the 
facts of Mr. Horn's case. Both instances involve the incorporation of 
a statutory obligation into the employment relationship between a 
public employee and a public employer. In both cases the employer's 
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statutory obligation is read into the contractual employment 
relationship so as to provide an essential term of that contract. In 
both cases the power of the legislature to make necessary adjustments 
to the statute being read into the contract is recognized10. Clearly, 
if one Utah public employee has a contractual right to enforce the 
terms of the employment relationship supplied by statute, another 
should as well. It is inconsistent and illogical to argue that a 
statutory entitlement to a pension is qualitatively different that a 
statutory entitlement to "just cause" termination. It is equally 
illogical to claim that statutorily created pension rights are 
contractual in the nature of their enforcement but the right to "just 
cause" termination is not11. The principle should likewise be applied 
to the present case.12 
B. Because Mr. Horn's Employment Contract With The 
Department Is Founded Upon A Written Instrument, The 
Applicable Statute Qf Limitations Is Six Years, 
The trial court erred when it held that Mr. Horn's claim was 
The Newcomb court continued, "as pensions granted to employees of the state or its 
municipalities are purely of statutory origin, the employees, in making contracts of 
employment under which the right to participate in the pension fund accrues, do so in 
contemplation of the reserved right of the Legislature to amend or to repeal the laws on 
which the pension systems are founded; and therefore the right to participate in the 
fund, even though arising from the contract, is based upon the anticipated continuance 
of existing laws." Id. at 946. 
The Newcomb court summed it up by stating: "This court in the Driggs case 
stated that when a person has accepted an offer of the State or of one of its agencies, 
and has met all the conditions thereof, the State or agency is bound to perform the 
contract the same as a private person must perform. That principle applies in this 
case." Id. at 947. 
The theory that the employment relationship between a public employee and his 
employer as espoused in Newcomb and Driggs was affirmed in Ellis v. Utah State 
Retirement Board, 757 P.2d 8 82 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Once again, in the context of 
public employment, the Courts of this state ruled that: "Utah adheres to the contractual 
line of authority Since Driggs, ... our supreme court has consistently held that 
the employee has this vested contractual right ...." See also Yeazell v. Copins, 402 
P.2d 541 (Utah 1965). 
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controlled by the three year limitations period rather than the six 
year period governing claims founded on written instruments. In this 
case, Mr. Horn is employed pursuant to an express contract. This 
express contract is founded upon several written instruments. ""[I]f 
the fact of liability arises or is assumed or imposed from the 
instrument itself, or its recitals, the liability is founded upon an 
instrument in writing.'" Brigham Young University v. Paulsen 
Construction Co., 744 P. 2d 1370, 1372 (Utah 1987) (quoting Bracklein 
v. Realty Insurance Co., 80 P.2d 471, 476 (1938)). 
Here, the liability Mr. Horn seeks to have redressed arises out 
of the express and written DHRM rules and regulations and the 
Management Act. These constitute the written employment contract 
between Mr. Horn and the Department. These constitute written 
instruments. Thus, the six year limitations period should apply. 
Even if the Court were to find that Mr. Horn's claims arise under 
both a written instrument and a statutory scheme, the six year 
limitations period would apply. Under Utah law, if an agreement can 
be construed as both arising under contract and by statute, the 
longer period of limitation applies. Juab County Dept. of Pub. 
Welfare v. Summers, 426 P. 2d 1 (Utah 1967)13. 
Thus, the six year statute of limitations should apply to this 
13 u 
If the transaction be in doubt as to whether it be one under a written 
contract or one created by a statute of this State, generally the one giving the longest 
period of limitation is to be preferred. See 1 C.J.S. Actions § 46, at page 1102, where 
the following language is found: "The action, in the case of doubt, should be construed 
to uphold it rather than to defeat it, as the court presumes the pleader's purpose is to 
serve his best interest. Accordingly, the action should ordinarily be so construed as to 
sustain the complaint if the allegations are sufficient to state a good cause of action 
in contract, but not in tort, or vice versa; and so as to sustain the jurisdiction if 
the court would have jurisdiction of the action in one form but not in the other; and so 
as to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations if the action would be barred in one 
form but not the other." [Emphasis added.] Id. at 3. 
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case. Moreover, under Utah case law, the three-year statute of 
limitations imposed by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-26 is restricted mainly 
to situations involving claims involving workman's compensation or 
unemployment compensation. Both of which are statutorily created 
remedial schemes for which no alternative remedy exists. There are 
no reported cases in which a claim similar to that asserted by Mr. 
Horn has been subjected to the three-year period of limitations. To 
do so in this case would be contrary to the mandates of Utah law. 
Under Utah law a contract claim based upon a written policy or 
bylaw is subject to the six-year period of limitations found in UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-12-23. In State of Utah ex rel Baker v. Intermountain 
Farmers Association, 668 P.2d 503 (Utah 1983) the court stated that 
an obligation created by a bylaw of IFA was subject to a six-year 
statute of limitation. See also Ward v. Intermountain Farmers 
Associationf 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995). This is because the claim was 
founded upon a written instrument. As such, it was entitled to the 
six year statute of limitations. Here, Mr. Horn's contract claim is 
founded upon written instruments. As such, he too is entitled to the 
protections of the six year statute of limitations. 
The contested portions of Mr. Horn's contract consist of the 
written provisions found in DHRM regulations and state statute. Mr. 
Horn has not alleged that his employment was covered by an "implied in 
law" contract on the issue of his right to a "just cause" 
termination. Mr. Horn's contract is express and it is written. The 
distinction is made clear in Woodland Theatres, Inc. v. ABC 
Intermountain Theatres, Inc., 560 P.2d 700 (Utah 1977). "An implied 
covenant must rest entirely on the presumed intention of the parties 
as gathered from the terms as actually expressed in the written 
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instrument itself, . ..." Id. at 703. Thus, we are not dealing with 
an implied contractual term in this case. We are dealing with an 
express, written contract consisting of several documents. Wherever 
possible, multiple writings must be considered together when part of 
the same contract. Verhoef v. Aston, 740 P. 2d 1342, 1344 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987); Nish Noroian Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 
611 P.2d 1170, 1175 (Cal. 1984); HCA Health Services of Utah, Inc. v. 
St. Mark's Charities, 846 P.2d 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Also, when 
an agreement between parties is contained in more than one 
instrument, those instruments must be construed together as though 
they comprise a single document. Chambliss/Jenkins Assocs. v. 
Forster, 650 P.2d 1315, 1318 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); HCA Health 
Services of Utah, Inc. v. St. Mark's Charities, 846 P. 2d 476 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993). 
Because Utah courts have construed the employment relationship 
between a public employee and his employer as contractual, the trial 
court committed error when it found otherwise. The Management Act 
does not make Mr. Horn's relationship with the Department solely 
statutory. Rather, the Management Act simply defines Mr. Horn's 
status as a public employee. Further, the Management Act provides 
the mandate that the written employment contract, in the form of 
rules and regulations must be established. Thus, Mr. Horn's claims 
arise out of a written instrument and the six year statute of 
limitations should apply. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IS DISMISSING MR. HOMfS PERCEIVED 
HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION CLAIM UNDER §504 OF THE 
REHABILITATION ACT. 
A. Because The Discovery Rule Applies To The Facts Of 
This Case, The Statute Of Limitations Was Tolled And 
-34-
Mr. Horn's Rehabilitation Act Claim Was Timely 
Asserted, 
Mr. Horn sought to amend his verified complaint to add a claim 
for discrimination on the basis of a perceived handicap pursuant to 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et 
seq. The factual basis for Mr. Horn's perceived handicap 
discrimination claim was uncovered late in the course of pre-trial 
discovery during his federal lawsuit. Mr. Horn did not become aware 
of the factual basis for a perceived handicap discrimination claim 
until he had secured the depositions of Roland Squire, Arthur 
Hudachko, Richard Townsend, Cherie Ertel and Douglas Bodrero. These 
depositions were secured in July and August 1994. In this case, Mr. 
Horn was prevented from learning the facts supporting a claim for 
perceived handicap discrimination until the facts were revealed 
during the discovery process in Mr. Horn's federal lawsuit. 
Appellees' perception of Mr. Horn was never admitted in pleadings or 
discovery until disclosed under questioning by Mr. Horn's counsel. 
Thus, the "discovery rule" should apply to prevent the running of the 
applicable four year statute of limitations. 
In Utah, "[w]hether the discovery rule applies to toll the 
statute of limitations is a question of law[.]" Sevy v. Security 
Title Co., 857 P.2d 958, 961 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing Klinger v. 
Kightly, 791 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1990)). The general rule is that 
"the limitation period begins to run when the last event necessary to 
complete the cause of action occurs. The discovery rule is an 
exception to the general rule, it delays the running of the 
limitation period until discovery of facts forming the basis for the 
cause of action." Sevy v. Security Title Co. of So. Utah, 902 P. 2d 
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629, 634 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted) Thus, "the discovery rule 
operates to extend the time from which the limitations period begins 
to run." Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 578 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citing Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 
P.2d 1229, 1231 (Utah 1995)). "If the discovery rule applies, the 
applicable statute of limitations is held to have commenced running 
only at the time the plaintiff first knew or should have known of the 
facts giving rise to the cause of action." Anderson, 920 P.2d at 578 
(citations omitted). It is Mr. Horn's contention that the discovery 
rule does apply in this case. 
There are three situations in which the discovery rule applies: 
(1) in situations where the discovery rule is mandated by 
statute; (2) in situations where a plaintiff does not become 
aware of the cause of action because of the defendant's 
concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) in situations where 
the case presents exceptional circumstances and the application 
of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of 
any showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery of 
the cause of action. 
Anderson, 920 P. 2d at 578 (citation omitted); accord Klinger v. 
Rightly, 791 P.2d 868, 872 (Utah 1990); Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 
84, 86 (Utah 1981 )). 
In this case the discovery rule should be applied pursuant to 
the second and/or third situation. In the present case, Mr. Horn did 
not know, nor could he have known that one of the motivations for his 
termination was the perception of his employer and others that he had 
a mental handicap. When Mr. Horn was terminated he was told that he 
was being terminated for three reasons, none of which would have led 
him to pursue a handicap discrimination claim. In fact, the 
Appellees would have been foolish to apprise Mr. Horn of this reason 
for his termination as it would have subjected them to liability for 
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handicap discrimination. Thus, they concealed this motivating 
factor. It was not until Mr. Horn had the opportunity to take the 
depositions of critical witnesses in his federal case that he learned 
that there was a perception that he was handicapped. 
Here two of the three circumstances are applicable. First, 
pursuant to the "concealment" circumstance exception of the discovery 
rule, a defendant who misleads a plaintiff or "causes a delay in the 
bringing of a cause of action is estopped from relying on the statute 
of limitations as a defense to the action." Warren v. Provo City 
Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Utah 1992)14. Thus, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that he acted reasonably in not bringing the action 
during the limitations period. 
Early in the course of the litigation, Mr. Horn, through 
interrogatories, asked the defendants to disclose all of their 
reasons for terminating Mr. Horn from his employment with the 
Department, both those disclosed to Mr. Horn and those withheld from 
Mr. Horn. In their response, Appellees did not indicate that they 
perceived the Mr. Horn as being mentally and/or emotionally disabled. 
Mr. Horn was completely unaware that the Appellees perceived him as 
having a handicap and that this perception was a basis for his 
termination. Discovery continued and finally during the course of 
deposition testimony of certain of the Appellees and several of their 
witnesses, Mr. Horn learned that he had been perceived as handicapped 
by Appellees. Thus, until the deposition testimony secured in the 
late summer of 1994, Mr. Horn was completely in the dark about certain 
The concealment circumstance exception of the discovery rule "is essentially a 
form of equitable estoppel, whereby a defendant who causes a delay in the bringing of a 
cause of action is estopped from relying on the statute of limitations as a defense to 
the action." Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d at 1130 (footnote omitted). 
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facts surrounding his wrongful termination. Because this knowledge 
was solely within the control and province of the Appellees, there 
was absolutely no way that Mr. Horn could have known of the Appellees' 
discriminatory motives behind his termination and there was 
absolutely no way that a reasonable plaintiff in good faith could 
have brought suit within the statutory period. 
Mr. Horn took reasonable steps to determine his causes of action 
against the Appellees for his wrongful termination. In his federal 
lawsuit, Mr. Horn sent out discovery requests. It took the defendants 
in that case, all of whom are Appellees herein, more than two years 
to file their responses. In addition, it took them two years to file 
an answer to Mr. Horn's federal complaint. Mr. Horn sought the 
assistance of the federal court on numerous occasions. It cannot be 
said that Mr. Horn was not diligent. Mr. Horn needed the responses to 
his discovery requests before he could thoughtfully and carefully 
depose Ertel, Bodrero, Hudachko, Squire and Townsend. The delay in 
finally learning of this illegal reason for his termination lies 
squarely on the shoulders of the Appellees. A copy of the Docket in 
the federal case is attached as part of the Addendum to this Brief. 
It indicates that the Appellees were to blame for any delay in Mr. 
Horn taking the depositions of the critical witnesses. 
Second, the "exceptional circumstances" exception of the 
discovery rule also applies to toll the statute of limitations in 
this case. In order for the exceptional circumstances exception to 
apply, "the plaintiff must make an initial showing1 that the 
plaintiff did not know of and could not reasonably have known of the 
existence of the cause of action in time to file a claim within the 
limitation period. !ff Sevy v. Security Title Co., 857 P.2d 958, 962 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 
1125, 1129 (Utah 1992)). 
There were no facts or indications during the statutory period 
which would have apprised Mr. Horn that he had been discriminated 
against based on a perceived handicap. Thus, the "threshold 
requirement11 that Mr. Horn show that he did not know and could not 
have known of the existence of the cause of action until the 
limitations period lapsed, has been satisfied. 
Once the threshold requirement is established, "then the 
reviewing court moves to the balancing test. The balancing test is 
[t]he ultimate determination of whether a case presents exceptional 
circumstances that render the application of a statute of limitations 
irrational or unjust ....'" Sevy, 857 P.2d at 963 (quoting Warren, 
838 P.2d at 1129). "[I]n applying the balancing test a court will 
balance the hardship the statute of limitations would impose on the 
plaintiff against any prejudice to the defendant resulting from 
difficulties of proof caused by the passage of time." Sevy, 857 P.2d 
at 963 (citations omitted). 
Here the balancing test weighs in favor of tolling the statute 
of limitations. First, the Appellees have prevented Mr. Horn from 
learning that he was perceived as handicapped by the Appellees. The 
Appellees have discriminated against Mr. Horn in violation of federal 
statutory law. If the trial court's decision is allowed to stand, 
then the Appellees will have succeeded in avoiding the consequences 
of their blatant discrimination. If Mr. Horn is not allowed to pursue 
his claim for violation of his rights as guaranteed by the 
Rehabilitation Act, a message is sent to the Appellees that they can 
discriminate and get away with it as long as they conceal certain 
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facts and refuse to reveal them until the applicable statute of 
limitations has passed. 
Second, there are no significant problems of proof for 
Appellees. During the depositions previously mentioned, it was 
brought to the fore that Mr. Horn was perceived as having a mental 
and/or emotional disability. Thus, the evidence and proof is still 
fresh in the Appellees memory.15 And if not, it has been memorialized 
in their depositions. Moreover, because Mr. Horn's handicap 
discrimination claim is based on "perception11, it is not necessary 
for the Appellees to engage an expert to evaluate Mr. Horn's mental 
state then existing mental state, unless of course Appellees want to 
prove that Mr. Horn was in fact handicapped. In addition, because Mr, 
Horn's claim is based on the perception of the Appellees, no 
additional discovery is necessary. Thus, there is little, if any, 
inequity that will result to the Appellees if the discovery rule is 
applied. 
B. Mr. Horn's Rehabilitation Act Claim Is Not Barred By 
The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel. 
The facts of this case do not support the conclusion of the 
trial court that Mr. Horn may be collaterally estopped from asserting 
his claim for perceived handicap discrimination under § 504 of the 
In Sevy v. Security Title Co., 857 P.2d 958 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the Court stated 
that if the balancing test had been applied to the facts in the Sevy case, such 
application would create significant problems of proof for the defendant because the key 
witness had "no memory of the critical facts." Id. at 964 (emphasis in original). In 
the present case, defendants and their key witnesses all have memory of their 
perceptions of plaintiff's mental and emotional state. Thus, the balance is in 
plaintiff's favor and the statute of limitations should be tolled to allow Mr. Horn to 
state his claim for handicap discrimination. 
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Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.16 "Collateral 
estoppel, also referred to as issues preclusion, prevents 
relitigation of issues raised, litigated, and resolved in a previous 
action." Maoris & Associates, Inc. v. Images & Attitude, Inc., 941 
P.2d 636, 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). At the trial court, the 
Appellees sought the application of collateral estoppel. In order to 
do so, it was necessary for them to establish four elements: 
First, the issue challenged must be identical in the previous 
action and in the case at hand. Second, the issue must have 
been decided in a final judgment on the merits in the previous 
action. Third, the issue must have been competently, fully, and 
fairly litigated in the previous action. Fourth, the party 
against whom collateral estoppel is invoked in the current 
action must have been either a party or privy to a party in the 
previous action. 
Id. (quoting Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 
1366, 1370 (Utah 1996)); Sevy v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629 
(Utah 1995). The party who raises the defense of collateral estoppel 
has the burden of proof. Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P. 2d 1178, 1184 (Utah 
1993). The Appellees failed to prove the existence of all four 
collateral estoppel requirements and the trial court committed error 
when it concluded that collateral estoppel applied to prevent Mr. Horn 
from maintaining his perceived handicap discrimination claim. 
Because the Appellees did not establish the first two 
requirements of collateral estoppel, the trial court committed error 
in ruling that Mr. Horn's perceived handicap discrimination claim was 
While not included in the actual order prepared by Appellees' trial counsel and 
entered by the Court, the Court noted in its ruling from the bench that the collateral 
estoppel doctrine may apply. R. at 1123. 
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barred by collateral estoppel from relating back . 
Initially, Mr. Horn's motion seeking leave to amend his complaint 
in the federal court was denied on the basis that the motion was 
untimely in that trial was two months away and would therefore be 
prejudicial to the defendants in that case. This was affirmed by the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Horn v. Squire, 81 F.3d 969, 973 
(10th Cir. 1996). Second, the federal court decision did not 
consider or reach the issue of equitable tolling under the "discovery 
rule." 
The issue decided by the federal court was not identical to the 
one at hand due to the absence in this case of undue prejudice 
against the Defendants/Appellees. The primary ground cited by the 
federal court for a denial of the motion to amend is not a factor in 
thi* oiiii H«na«, th«r« ia no identity of lisuns, Moreover, the 
refusal of the federal court to consider the issue of equitable 
tolling under the "discovery rule" restricted its ruling on the issue 
of "relation back" to the extent that the issue is different than 
that presented in this case18. In other words, had the federal court 
ruled that the discovery rule did not or could not apply to the facts 
presented, and if the federal court had not disposed of the issue 
pursuant to facts that do not exist in the present case, there would 
have been issue identity. Similarly, the federal court expressly 
While Mr. Horn did seek approval from the United States District Court, pursuant 
to FED. R. CIV. P. 15 to amend his federal complaint to add a claim for handicap 
discrimination, the issue was not decided in such a way as to preclude the issue from 
consideration by the trial court. 
18 
"The court expressly declines to rule in the present context on the law concerning 
accrual and tolling of causes of action and how the law may or may not affect the 
validity of a handicap discrimination claim under the controlling statute of 
limitations. The present posture of the case does not present facts upon which to make 
such a ruling." R. 419. 
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declined to rule on the applicability of the "discovery rule" with 
regard to Mr. Horn's motion to amend, primarily because of the short 
time remaining before the trial date. Thus, the issue of "relation 
back" was not decided in a final adjudication on the merits. 
Mr. Horn maintains that under Utah law, as illustrated in the 
Selvage case, supra, the full scope of the issue in the present case 
includes a determination on the merits of whether the "discovery 
rule" should apply. If the discovery rule does apply, then the 
running of the statute of limitation is tolled until such time as the 
discovery is made. Sevy v. Security Title Co. of So. Utah, 902 P. 2d 
629, 634 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted). Without a determination of 
that portion of the issue at hand, there cannot be an accurate 
decision on the sub-issue of Rule 15(c) relation back. Further, 
because the federal court skirted around the discovery rule issue, it 
gave an incomplete and qualitatively different decision on the issue 
of Rule 15(c) relation back. In sum, because of the overbearing 
weight of the undue prejudice issue caused by the imminent trial 
date, the federal court essentially decided a wholly different issue 
than the one presented in this case. 
C. Mr, Horn's Perceived Handicap Discrimination Claim Is 
Meritorious And Should Be Considered By The Trial 
Court. 
The depositions of three individuals, each a Defendant in this 
case, demonstrate that the Appellees perceived Mr. Horn as being 
mentally handicapped19. 
Douglas Bodrero, the Appellee who made the ultimate decision to terminate Mr. 
Horn's employment, gave his deposition on July 12, 1994. Arthur Hudachko, one of Mr. 
Horn's direct supervisors, gave his deposition on August 5, 1994. Richard Townsend, who 
authored a memorandum accusing Mr. Horn of being a security risk, gave his deposition on 
July 14, 1994. 
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Mr. Horn was never informed that any action, adverse or 
otherwise, was taken against him because of a perceived handicap. In 
fact, the Appellees were careful to prevent Mr. Horn from learning 
that this was one of the motivations for his termination. To do 
otherwise would have been a direct admission that the law had been 
broken. Mr. Horn never considered himself to be handicapped. In 
short, there was no basis from which to learn that a perceived 
handicap had played any part in the decision to terminate Mr. Horn 
until mid-July 1994. 
Prior to 1988, Mr. Horn had a very successful career with the 
Department. During his involvement with the RFP committee, Mr. Horn 
did two things which are important to this case: (1) he nearly worked 
himself to death trying to keep up with the demands of his job and 
the added responsibilities of the RFP committee work; and (2) he 
spoke out against what he perceived to be violations of Utah law 
dealing with the procurement process. When Mr. Horn saw that his 
admonitions about the law being violated were being ignored and 
causing him to be retaliated against rather than appreciated for his 
dedication, he decided to file a grievance for the unpaid overtime he 
had put in on the RFP committee work. From that point forward, Mr. 
Horn's career took a nose dive. Mr. Horn's grievance was resolved in 
his favor in late 1988. Within one year, by November 1989, Mr. Horn 
was being fired. 
Mr. Horn challenged the illegal firing for the reasons which were 
apparent to him. However, during the course of discovery in his 
federal case, it became clear that his employer, his supervisors, and 
some of his co-workers perceived him as being emotionally or mentally 
handicapped. It also became clear that these people saw his 
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emotional and mental state deteriorate during the time he worked on 
the RFP committee. They saw a cause and effect relationship based on 
a "before and after" comparison of Mr. Horn's demeanor. 
It also became clear during discovery in the federal case that 
the Appellees had programs intended and designed specifically to 
address such perceived problems. The Department, like any other Utah 
State government entity, has an Employee Assistance Program which can 
be used to deal with stress related employment issues. This program 
has been used with other employees who were perceived as suffering 
from emotional overload in the past. In addition, the Department has 
a "fitness for duty" procedure which had also been used in the past 
to determine if an employee was emotionally, mentally, or physically 
able to do his or her job. 
Despite the congruence of perception that Mr. Horn was 
handicapped and the availability of programs and procedures to deal 
with such a problem, the Appellees chose not to give Mr. Horn the 
protections he was entitled to under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
20 
The Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA") became law on July 
26, 1992. Mr. Horn was fired in 1990. Prior to the ADA, the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Act") covered handicap discrimination. 
The Act "prohibits programs receiving federal financial assistance 
from discriminating against handicapped persons solely because of 
that handicap." Welsh v. City of Tulsa, Oklahoma, 977 F.2d 1415, 
1417 (10th Cir. 1992) (footnote omitted). There should be little 
Specifically, Hudachko, Townsend, Bodrero and Ertel stated that they perceived Mr. 
Horn as being handicapped. R. 524, 525-26, 527, 528, 519-23, 537, 538, 553, 554, 586, 
587, 588, 606, 615-16, 618, 619. 
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question that a state police agency is an entity receiving federal 
financial assistance, making it subject to the mandates of the Act. 
Henning v. Village of Mayfield, 610 F. Supp. 17 (N.D.Ohio 1985) 
(finding that a police agency which receives federal funding renders 
the entire municipality subject to the mandate of the Rehabilitation 
Act). Moreover, according to 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(f), any state or 
political subdivisions such a recipient. 
Mr. Horn also must demonstrate that he is handicapped. Under the 
Act, a handicapped person is defined as a person who "(I) has a 
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits on or more 
of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an 
impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 29 
U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B) (emphasis added). ""Major life activities' 
means "functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual 
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and 
working.'" Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d at 1417 (quoting 45 
C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii)). It is Mr. Horn's contention that he was 
discriminated against because the Appellees regarded him as having a 
mental impairment which substantially limited his ability to work, 
not only as a computer programmer, but in any capacity as an employee 
at all. 
Based on the evidence, Mr. Horn asserted a prima facie case of 
handicap discrimination under the Act: (1) he was perceived as being 
a handicapped person, as the term is defined under the Act; (2) he 
was otherwise qualified to perform the duties assigned to him; (3) he 
was discriminated against; and (4) the discrimination was because of 
the perceived handicap. Mental or emotional illness is recognized as 
a handicapping condition. Doe v. New York University, 666 F.2d 761 
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(2d Cir. 1981); Doe v. Colantti, 454 F. Supp. 621 (E.D.Pa. 1978), 
aff'd, 592 F.2d 704 (3rd. Cir. 1979); Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-
Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1402, rehearing denied, 709 F.2d 
712 (5th Cir. 1983). 
It should also be noted, that if a handicapped person, as 
defined under the Act, is unable to perform all requirements of a 
job, he or she is still "otherwise qualified" and protected if any 
"reasonable accommodation" by the employer would enable the employee 
to perform those tasks. School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 107 
S.Ct. 1123, 1131 n.17 (1987); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k). Mr. Horn asserts 
that there were methods available to provide him with reasonable 
accommodation for this perceived handicap which were consciously 
ignored by the defendants. 
In addition to the Department being liable, here the individual 
Appellees were sued in both a personal and representative capacity. 
In Association for Retarded Citizens in Colorado v. Frazier et al., 
517 F. Supp. 105 (D.C. Colo. 1981) an individual sued in his 
representative capacity was held a proper party in a § 504 action. 
According to this decision, applying Tenth Circuit precedent, each 
individual defendant was a "recipient" within the meaning of the 
definition at 45 C.F.R. §84.3(f). See, also Mackey v. Cleveland State 
University et al., 837 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D. Ohio 1993). Thus, the 
individual Appellees are proper defendants in this action. 
III. BECAUSE MR. HOM'S RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS EMPLOYER WAS 
CONTRACTUAL RATHER THAN STATUTORY, THE TRIAL COURT 
COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT DISMISSED HIS CLAIM FOR BREACH OF 
THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. 
Because the character of the employment relationship is 
contractual and not statutory, the trial court committed error when 
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it dismissed Mr. Horn's claim for breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing21. 
A claim based on a breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing gives rise to a claim for breach of contract. 
Peterson v. Browning, 832 P. 2d 1280 (Utah 1992) (quoting Beck v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985)). Mr. Horn 
maintains that his public agency employer (and its employees and 
agents) retained a power of sole discretion through the express 
employment contract discussed above, which obligated them to exercise 
that discretion reasonably and in good faith. Mr. Horn further 
maintains that given the circumstances of his termination, the 
Appellees acted contrary to a covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
and thereby breached the employment contract governing Mr. Horn's 
employment. See Cook v. Zions First National Bank, 919 P. 2d 56 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996); Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P. 2d 49 (Utah 1991). 
According to McKean v. McBride, 884 P. 2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994), any action based upon a written instrument, as in this case, 
can be brought within six years. In this case, the good faith claim 
is based on a specific written contract term which expressly holds 
the decision maker to a just cause standard. There is no basis to 
claim that the obligation to apply the just cause standard in good 
faith is somehow different in kind than any other provision of the 
employment contract. If any aspect of this contract is subject to 
n[E]very contract is subject to an implied covenant of good faith, that implied 
covenant 'cannot be construed to establish new, independent rights or duties not agreed 
upon by the parties.'" Sanderson v. First Security Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 303, 308 (Utah 
1992) (citation omitted). 
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the six-year statute of limitations, all aspects of it are22. 
Because the underlying contract in this case is founded upon 
written instruments, the applicable statute of limitations is six 
years23 Thus, Mr. Horn's good faith and fair dealing was improperly 
dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing and on the record herein, Mr. Hom 
respectfully requests that the Court reverse the decision of the 
trial court and remand this case back to the trial court where it may 
proceed to trial. 
DATED AND RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /^*day of November, 
1997. 
L. ZANE GILL, P.C. 
X fo«p. 
L>* Zarie Gill 
Attorney for Appellant 
In City of Terre Haute v. Brighton, 450 N.E.2d 1039 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) the 
following points are made which apply to the question at hand: (1) firefighters' 
relationship with the City is contractual; (2) the fireman's "tenure act" is part of 
their contract; (3) the "tenure act" establishes particular requirements for dismissal 
or demotion; (4) notwithstanding the statutory remedy provided by the "tenure act", a 
common law action in contract is still available; and (5) despite the argument of the 
public employer, the limitations period in the City's Tort Claims Act is not applicable. 
23 
Generally, "a covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in most, if not 
all, contractual relationships." St. Benedict's Dev. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 
P.2d 194, 199-200 (Utah 1991) . Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, each 
party to a contract impliedly promises not to "intentionally or purposely do anything 
which will destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the fruits of the 
contract." Id. at 199. A violation of this covenant gives rise to a claim for breach of 
contract. Id. at 200. Whether there has been a breach of contract is generally a 
"factual issue to be determined by [the fact finder] after consideration of all 
attendant circumstances and evidence...." Western Farm Credit Bank v. Pratt, 860 P.2d 
376, 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
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Addendum 
29 U.S.C. § 7041 Nondiscrimination under Federal grants and 
programs; promulgation of rules and regulations (See Addendum) 
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the 
United States, as defined in section 706(7) of this title, 
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from 
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program 
or activity conducted by and Executive agency or by the 
United States Postal Service. The head of each such agency 
shall promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to 
carry out the amendments to this section made by the 
Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental 
Disabilities Act of 1978. Copies of any proposed regulation 
shall be submitted to appropriate authorizing committees of 
the Congress, and such regulation may take effect no earlier 
than the thirtieth day after the date on which such 
regulation is so submitted to such committees. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19-18 Dismissals and demotions - Grounds -
Disciplinary action - Procedure - Reductions in force. 
(1) Career service employees may be dismissed or demoted: 
(a) to advance the good of the public interest; or 
(b) for just causes such as inefficiency, 
incompetency, failure to maintain skills or adequate 
performance levels, insubordination, disloyalty to the 
orders of a superior, misfeasance, malfeasance, or 
nonfeasance in office. 
(2) Employees may not be dismissed because of race, sex, 
age, physical handicap, national origin, religion, political 
affiliation, or other nonmerit factor including the exercise 
of rights under this chapter. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-23 (1953), as amended. Within six years -
Mesne profits of real property - Instrument in writing. 
An action may be brought within six years: 
(1) for the mesne profits of real property; 
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded 
upon an instrument in writing, except those mentioned 
in Section 78-12-22. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25 (1953), as amended. Within four years. 
An action may be brought within four years: 
(1) upon a contract, obligation or liability not 
founded upon an instrument in writing; also on an open 
account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and for any 
As it existed at the times relevant to Mr. Horn's termination from his employment at the Department. 
article charged on a store account also on an open 
account for work, labor or services rendered, or 
materials furnished; provided, that action in all of 
the foregoing cases may be commenced at any time within 
four years after the last charge is made or the last 
payment is received; 
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-26 (1953), as amended. Within three years. 
An action may be brought within three years. 
(4) for a liability created by the statutes of this 
state, other than for a penalty or forfeiture under the 
lease of this state, except where in special cases a 
different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of 
this state; 
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Bordrero (hm) 
5/27/93 4 9 Answer by Arthur J. Hudachko, A. Roland Squires, Douglas 
Bordrero to amended complaint (hm) 
5/27/93 50 Certificate of service of ans to 2nd req for prod/docs and 
1st interrog and req for prod/docs by Arthur J. Hudachko, 
A. Roland Squires, Douglas Bordrero (hm) 
10/29/93 51 Motion by Arthur J. Hudachko, A. Roland Squires, Douglas 
Bordrero to compel pla to ans dfts' 1st interrog and req 
for prod/docs (hm) 
11/1/93 52 Notice of Hearing filed: Motion hearing set for 10:00 
11/16/93 for [51-1] motion to compel pla to ans dfts' 1st 
interrog and req for prod/docs JUDGE: RNB (bn) 
[Entry date 11/02/93] 
11/12/93 53 Certificate of service 1st req for adm by Michael Horn (hm) 
[Entry date 11/15/93] 
11/16/93 54 Minute entry:, Motion hearing held for [51-1] motion to 
compel pla to ans dfts' 1st interrog and req for prod/docs 
granting [51-1] motion to compel pla to ans dfts' 1st 
interrog and req for prod/docs. Face to face conf under 
Rule 204(g) is to occur no later than 12-3-93, Pla is to 
be present at the conf or to be accessible by phone to 
answer questions. Dft to prepare order. ; Judge: Ronald N. 
Boyce Court Reporter: Electronic Court Deputy: Sharon K. 
Spratley (ss) [Entry date 11/17/93] 
12/6/93 55 Notice by Michael Horn to take deposition of UT Dept of 
Public Safety, 12/22/93, (hm) [Entry date 12/07/93] 
12/6/93 56 Motion by Arthur J. Hudachko, A. Roland Squires, Douglas 
Bordrero to continue trial at least 3 months beyond 
present setting (hm) [Entry date 12/07/93] 
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Notice by Arthur J. Hudachko, A. Roland Squires, Douglas 
Bordrero to take deposition of Michael Horn, 1/8/94 (hm) 
[Entry date 12/07/93] 
Notice of Hearing filed : Motion hearing set for 2:00 
12/28/93 for [56-1] motion to continue trial at least 3 
months beyond present setting JUDGE: RNB; cc:attys (hm) 
Notice by Arthur J. Hudachko, A. Roland Squires, Douglas 
Bordrero to take deposition of Michael Horn, 1/29/94 (hm) 
Second Motion by Arthur J. Hudachko, A, Roland Squires, 
Douglas Bordrero to compel ans to 1st interrog and req for 
prod/docs (hm) 
Return of service of subpoena duces tecum as to D. Douglas 
Bodrero commisioner of UT State Dept of Public Safety c/o 
Carolyn Davis executed 12/6/93. (hm) [Entry date 12/15/93] 
Notice of Hearing filed by defendant Arthur J. Hudachko, 
defendant A. Roland Squires, defendant Douglas Bordrero : 
Motion hearing set for 2:00 12/28/93 for [60-1] motion to 
compel ans to 1st interrog and req for prod/docs JUDGE: 
RNB (sh) [Entry date 12/21/93] 
12/20/93 63 
12/22/93 64 
Order mooting [51-1] motion to compel pla to ans dfts' 1st 
interrog and req for prod/docs. Parties to have an 
informal disc cnf pursuant to rule 204-1(g) US Dist Court 
Rules. Cnf to be a face to face cnf between cnsl. Pla 
Michael Horn is to personally participate in this cnf, 
either in person or by phone. Cnf to take place no later 
than 12/3/93. If parties are unable to resolve their 
differences at this cnf, concerning pla's responses to 
dfts' disc requests, then dfts may bring an appropriate 
motion to compel signed by RNB, 12/20/93; cc:attys (hm) 
[Entry date 12/22/93] 
Certificate of service of supp ans to 1st interrog by 
Michael Horn (hm) [Entry date 12/23/93] 
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2:91cvl016 Horn. v. Squires, et al CLOSED AJ AL 
12/28 91: • 65 
12/28/93 66 
4/6/94 i" 
1 1 i nute entry: Motion hrg 1 ie 1 d - gi: an11ng [60- 1 ] mo::; 
:: - :: T ij • ; .1 ans to 1st interrog and req for prod/docs . Pltf 
:: :i : • :i = :i : s i to submit dmg calculations by 1/18/94 or be sub; 
sc ,1 i : • !:::i : ::1 ns Cnsl to prepare a form, for the pltf to sign 
under j: ., : ] I /; r of perjury re the dmg. calculations. Grsntinj 
[56-1] :i ' , : t: ,:i • I: .o continue trial at least 3 . months te/r- -
preser „ t: , ,• I !:: J :i .• :j scheduling order deadlines: setting 
Discover;; :i ; • ,: :i j :l I , n 5/1/94 Deadline for filing of all 
motions bj 5 1! 9 1 „nal Pretrial Conference for 8:00 9/7 
before Judge "1 ?::! i , i r Jury Trial for 9:00 9/26/94, 5 days, 
before Ji : „ I gr • "I Ji i , I 
reflectii , g !::l • i 
N. Boyce Cour 
SI iauklas • (kp) 
Ward to submit an order 
f the crt on the mots; Judge: Ronald 
Electronic Court Deputy: Kathlyn 
Motion by Michael Horn for Joinder RE: [56-1] motion to 
continue trial at least 3 months beyond present set4- -
[Entry date 12/29/93] 
I I :: t::::i • :: i : , I :: ^  1 iichael Horn t :: • 
[E" I : late 12/29/93] 
Certi ficate of service by Michael .i-:m i^ .. .,G Supp_ .-...swers 
t: : Defs' 1st Set of Interrogs mailed to cnsl on 1/17/94, , : ) 
[Entry date 01 II9 '94]' 
1 1 :: t :ii • :: •! i by Arthur J 1 Ii i ilachko, A Roland Squires, Douglas 
B :: r • ii = .r • : to compel pla to subnij t to a depo at - "' te & 
!::i r \ f i :  :ed by crt (ce) [Entry da te 04/07/94 ~ 
XW^JLCM 1U 
4 n 1 '94 
< >94 /JL 
4 / 2 8 / 9 4 
1 1 am ::: r ai I ::ii iiii I: ;; A i t l mr 3 Hudacl iko, A. 
D • : i i 3J B s B ::: ::i : • ::I::i : ero in support of [68-1] motit .ve 1 pla" 
b : • si J : ii: ii t to a depo at a da te & t i me fixed by err (ce) 
[E ; - la te 04 /07 /94] 
Memoi am ldum by 1 1 ii :::]l!: u .• = . ] 1 1 :: IIEI in opposition to [68-1] motion 
!:::c c o i n p e 1 p ] a t ::: si :i 1 : • IIII::i t t o a depo at a date & timp f ' vPd ' 
.• i ( k j ) [E , i :; L „ i .• : 1 / 1 2 / 9 4 ] 
1 I :: • tice of Heari ng fj 1 = .• :i : Motioi i 1: learing set for 
1 2 8/94 f or [ 68 II J m :: • t i :: i i to compel pla to submit to a der 
ai a' date .5, t:::i • • i f i : : i l  ] crt JUDGE: RNB. cc: - +- — 
Mi i m t e entry:, Mo tion hearing held for [68-1] motion to 
: .• : .i i[]j:: = . ] pla to submit to a depo at a date & time fixed by 
: :i : t :::i c ,i iting [68-1] motion to compel pla to submit to a 
i = ;;: o at a date & time fixed by crt. Depo of pla is to be 
tc J :en on 5/14/94. Dft to prepare order, ; Judge: Ronald N 
B :
 : - • : •  = Court Reporter: -electronic Court Deputy: Sharon K 
" a_ey (ss) r P^ry date 04/29/94] 
5/2/S cf service executed re subp served on records 
i cf Utah Dept of Public Safety c " ' s 
- T6/94 'ce) [Entry date 05/03/c . 
Docket as c ^ecembe: 
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2:91cvl016 Horn v. Squires, et al CLOSED APPEAL 
[Entry date 10/12/94] 
10/11/94 91 Memorandum by Michael Horn, in^ oppjo^ siticm to [89-1] 
suppTementTair support 'memorandum re due* process issues in 
supp of dfts mot/sum jgm AND memo in support of [90-1] 
motion to amend [1-1] complaint (ce) [Entry date 10/12/94] 
10/14/94 92 Notice of Hearing filed : Motion hearing set for 2:00 
10/31/94 for [90-1] motion to amend [1-1] complaint JUDGE: 
RNB (sh) [Entry date 10/17/94] 
10/18/94 93 Reply brief RE: [91-1] opposition/support memorandum filed 
by A. Roland Squires, Douglas Bordrero (cs) 
[Entry date 10/19/94] 
10/25/94 94 Notice of Hearing filed : Motion hearing set for 8:00 
11/22/94 for [84-1] motion for summary judgment dism the 
amd cmp w/prej JUDGE: DKW. cc: atty (ce) 
10/25/94 95 Motion by Michael Horn to use investigative internal 
affairs file as evidence at trial (ce) [Entry date 10/26/94] 
10/25/94 96 Memorandum by Michael Horn in support of [95-1] motion to 
use investigative internal affairs file as evidence at 
trial (ce) [Entry date 10/26/94] 
10/28/94 97 Memorandum by Arthur J. Hudachko, A. Roland Squires, 
Douglas Bordrero in opposition to [90-1] motion to amend 
[1-1] complaint (ce) 
10/28/94 98 Notice of Hearing filed : Motion hearing set for 2:00 
11/18/94 for [95-1] motion to use investigative internal 
affairs file as evidence at trial JUDGE: RNB. cc: 
atty (ce) [Entry date 10/31/94] 
10/31/94 99 Minute entry:, Motion hearing held for [90-1] motion to 
amend [1-1] complaint Pltf rep by Zane Gill; dft rep by 
Mark Ward. After hrg arguments from cnsl, further briefing 
is requested. Pltf brief is due 11/10/94 and resp is due 
11/16/94 - [90-1] motion to amend [1-1] complaint taken 
under advisement ; Judge: RNB Court Reporter: electronic 
Court Deputy: Michelle Peart (mp) [Entry date 11/03/94] 
11/1/94 — Transcript of Proceedings for dates of 9/8/94 re final 
pretrial conf held before DKW (ce) [Entry date 11/03/94] 
11/10/94 100 Supplemental Memorandum RE: [90-1] motion to amend [1-1] 
complaint filed by Michael Horn (ce) [Entry date 11/14/94] 
11/10/94 100 Reply by Michael Horn to response to [90-1] motion to amend 
[1-1] complaint (ce) [Entry date 11/14/94] 
11/15/94 101 Reply brief of dfts RE: [100-1] supp memo of pla's re 
mot/amd cmp (ce) [Entry date 11/16/94] 
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Response by UT Dept Pub Safety tt 
investigative internal affairs £ 
[Entry date 11/17/94] 
9 5-1] motion to use 
*"
 fivi,
^ence at trial 
t: 
a 
^ L;y: M. 
surjna: y 3 udgment 
Zar.e *ill. Def r> 
mo**o for summary 
under advisement ; 
Raymond Fenlon 
Memoran <^ m Decisio; 
T- * dism the amd 
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 t „ „ 
affairs file as e 
"t rep by M^ * 
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12 I "!: ' Ir — 
12/1/ 94 107 
12/2/"54 
12/20/94 109 
:>r Arthur J- " . " hko, ? Roland Squires, Douglas 
coru against Michael Hum signed by DKW, 12/1/94. 
Pla' d cmp dism w/prej. All parties to bear own atty 
fees/costs ~" -+---- '--* 
e closed ice) 
• :: yce (c€ ) 
of 1 re subp served on Dan Taylor, 
.. .r 94; t . /23/94; Ron Stringham, 11/29/94; 
.^^.:-Po Lee, 11/21/94; Judy Sorensen, 11/21/94; Phil 
.mgenpeel, 11/21/94; Cheri Ertel, 11/22/94; Robert W. 
L-draner, 11/22/94; Richard Townsend, 11/23/94; Thomas 
r^-le 11/22/94; Yolanda Stout, 11/22/94 - all served c/o 
' - **a—:e-C^ * 'ceN fEntry date 12/02'^* 
: . i - r,ed order from Arthur J. h . A . , . . *^= 
'.as Bordrero re; Hpnv^a : - 'a~d 
-y date 12/05/94 
[ Entr 
by RNB, 12/8/9 
1 nQ'94] 
"nmplaint 
Notice of appeal by Michael Hum, Fie Status: pd #64302. 
Appeals to the USCA for the Tent h circuit from the jgm 
pntp.rp.d on 12/1/94 and ordei entered on 12/8/94. (rb) 
Docket as cj jGCCilH-iV 
Proceedings include all events. 
2:91cvl016 Horn v. Squires, et al CLOSED APPEAL 
[Entry date 12/21/94] 
12/21/94 110 Notice of appeal and certified copy of docket to USCA: 
[109-1] appeal pkts sent to cnsl. (rb) 
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